Budgeting for austere defense. - Free Online Library (2024)

From the moment the Budget Control Act (BCA) was signed into lawthree years ago, many--including the president--said its mechanism toforce automatic spending cuts, known as sequestration, in the absence ofa larger "grand bargain" would never happen. By design,sequestration was constructed as an outcome so unpalatable that it wouldprompt compromise over larger federal budget issues such as entitlementsand taxes. As was argued at the time, sequestration spending cuts weretoo steep and too irresponsible to ever become law. According tothen-secretary of defense Leon Panetta, the sequester was akin to"shooting ourselves in the head." (1)

The increasingly likely prospect of sequestration as the date drewnear created a frenzy. (2) Politicians on both sides of the aisledenounced the action, the defense industry organized a well-funded andjob-centric education and lobbying campaign to emphasize its economicconsequences, and financial analysts scrambled to anticipatecongressional action and how it would impact the bottom line forcontractors.

But while the specter of sequestration loomed and all partiesfretted, there was a growing readiness crisis at the Department ofDefense (DoD). This challenge predates the debt limit deal of 2011 andwould not be alleviated simply by rescinding the BCA--itself a dauntingand unlikely proposition.

The problem is that it is impossible to identify which dollar brokethe proverbial camel's back when it comes to military readiness. Itcannot be clearly attributed to any one moment or any single decision.Rather, the US military appears to have crossed the "invisibleredline" of precariously reduced readiness as former chief ofstaff" of the Army, GEN George Casey, once warned against. (3)Because it is hard to pinpoint when the subjective threshold wascrossed, policymakers have been lulled into favoring false solutionsthat do not fully match the scope of the problem with an adequateanswer.

Policymakers must attempt to trace the impact of the Budget ControlAct--not just sequestration--upon the military both now and into thefuture. Only by chronicling how Congress and the president have enactedaustere defense spending and adjusted defense cuts through today andunderstanding how those translate in real ways for the Pentagon canleaders draw lessons from the current impasse while proposing realisticand timely solutions.

The Flawed Budget Control Act

Despite all the warnings, doomsday predictions, and lobbyingefforts to stop sequestration, these spending reductions went intoeffect in 2013--not with a bang, but with a whimper of resignation.Since then, despite short-term deals like one to avoid the so-calledfiscal cliff and a recent budget deal by Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI) andSenator Patty Murray (D-WA) that have provided the Defense Departmentwith modest breathing room, near-sequestration-level budgets are now thenorm. (4)

A year and a half into the sequester, the sky has yet to fall.While some systems--such as the Missile Defense Agency's precisiontracking satellite system, the Air Force's expeditionary combatsupport system, the space-based surveillance system follow-on satellite,and the Army's ground combat vehicle--have experienced budget cutsdue to the legislation, few high-profile modernization programs havefallen victim to sequestration. At the same time, end strengthreductions may be less severe than originally believed, and somedeferred maintenance and training is being gradually restored. Thesefactors and others seem to suggest the Pentagon has been able to muddlealong through sequestration's early squeeze. But the consequencesof reduced budgets since 2010 are still real, tangible, and chippingaway in slow motion at longstanding US military capabilities andcapacity.

US defense leaders were not wrong when they forecasted thedevastating implications sequestration--coming on top of previousreductions in spending--would have upon the national defense. Rather,these implications have been obscured, spread thin over many priorities,and in some cases forestalled through a series of budget deals,temporary measures, and special exemptions. These actions have created asort of sequestration purgatory where clear consequences of fundingshortfalls are becoming increasingly visible, but the full sequestrationbill has yet to come due. In the absence of the intense pain ofsequestration in one event or one fiscal year, lawmakers and evenPentagon officials have become sensitized to accept sequestration as thedecade-long baseline for austere defense spending.

With so much attention focused on sequestration, one can easilyforget that the US defense drawdown began three years ago. As formersecretary of defense Robert Gates outlined in January 2011, the Pentagonwas already on a path to cut or redirect about $478 billion in plannedspending due to various weapons cancelations, staff reductions, andefficiency initiatives. (5) These changes, combined with the persistentpace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, were already straining theforce--particularly during the summer of 2011 as the newly empoweredRepublican Congress and the White House became increasingly at odds overthe looming debt ceiling.

As Bob Woodward has chronicled, at the 11th hour, senior WhiteHouse staffers proposed resurrecting a little-known budgetary deviceknown as sequestration to act as a forcing mechanism to facilitate abroader compromise. (6) The idea was that sequestration would give bothDemocrats and Republicans a deadline and enough to dislike that theywould find a middle ground on entitlements and taxes. The finalagreement, coming in the form of the Budget Control Act, offset a debtlimit increase with just over $2 trillion in deficit reduction phased inover two tranches. (7)

The first tranche set a path to reduce the deficit by $917 billionbetween fiscal years 2012 and 2021, mostly through caps on discretionaryspending. The second tranche charged a joint select committee on deficitreduction (commonly known as the "Super Committee") withreaching a bipartisan agreement on a plan to reduce the deficit by atleast $1.5 trillion. If the Super Committee could not produce a plan toreduce the deficit by at least $1.2 trillion, sequestration would cutspending by that amount beginning in January 2013. (8)

A guiding principle of the BCA was the rough reciprocity betweendefense and non-defense discretionary spending, dividing its cuts moreor less evenly between the two. In its first round of spendingreductions, the BCA established a "firewall" between securityand non-security spending caps in 2012 and 2013. The legislation alsoprovided a total discretionary spending limit from 2014 to 2021 withoutenumerating a specific division between security and non-securityspending. (9) Pentagon spending comprises about 76 percent of the"security" spending category, which also includes funding forthe Department of Homeland Security, the International Affairs budgetcategory, and the Veterans Affairs Department. (10)

When the Super Committee failed to reach a compromise, the BCA notonly reverted to the lower budget caps provided for under itssequestration provision, but the composition of its discretionaryspending caps changed from the broader security category to the morenarrow national defense (050) budget function. The Pentagon accounts forabout 96 percent of the national defense budget category, so shiftingthe caps from security to defense had the effect of shifting more of theburden onto the military. (11)

This increased share of the load for defense was opposite of theoriginal intention of the firewalls. When similar firewalls were inplace during the 1990s, they served to protect defense spending. (12) Ifnon-defense appropriations broke discretionary spending limits, onlynon-defense spending would suffer a corresponding reduction. Defensewould be safely quarantined behind a firewall and unaffected.

Yet this principle was inverted by the debt ceiling deal. Insteadof protecting defense spending, politicians handcuffed thisconstitutional requirement to non-defense programs. Henceforth, wheneverCongress and the president revisited the spending caps, defense was heldhostage to one-for-one increases in non-defense spending. This presenteda major impediment that remains to this day for lawmakers skeptical ofincreasing domestic spending. The notion that defense spending has to betied to non-defense spending if any discretionary federal priorities areto grow is one of the most underappreciated and harmful legacies of theBCA.

The inverted firewall principle was not the only legacy consequenceof this legislation. On top of the BCA's first tranche, which cutdefense budgets by $487 billion through caps on discretionary spendingfrom 2012 to 2021, sequestration set defense on a path to further shrinkby about $500 billion. In 2013, these reductions were applied in apunitive, across-the-board fashion, while cuts in later years would intheory be applied in a more targeted way through lowered discretionarycaps.

Limited Relief as Drawdown Continues

Compared to the path set by then-secretary of defense Robert Gatesin fiscal year 2012, the first round of the BCA reduced Pentagondiscretionary budget authority by $487 billion over the next decade.This was carried out in a two-part process between the 2012 defenseappropriations bill and the 2013 president's budget request. (13)This resulted in reductions of roughly $45 to 50 billion per year inplanned spending relative to the Defense Department's five-yearspending plan known as the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) in 2012(see fig. 1).

The second tranche of the debt ceiling deal is the sequestrationmechanism triggered by the Super Committee's failure. Oncecomplete, this will further decrease defense spending by about $500billion through 2021, mostly through lowering defense caps. In theoriginal BCA, defense spending in 2013 faced a cut of about $55 billion,but unlike the later years of sequestration, cuts would be appliedacross the board to most of the Pentagon budget.

These plans were altered--but only slightly--by the AmericanTaxpayer Relief Act of 2012, also known as the "fiscal cliff"deal. This agreement delayed sequestration by two months, from Januaryto March 2013. The agreement also reduced the total sequestration billby the corresponding amount that would have been cut over January andFebruary if sequestration had been in effect--$12 billion for defensespending and $12 billion for non-defense spending. (14) The deal alsoimpacted defense in 2013 and 2014 by lowering national security spendingcaps by $2 billion and $4 billion respectively, while reverting the 2013cap to the broader security category from the narrower defense budgetfunction--giving the Pentagon a bit of relief from the lower 2013 cap.Overall, the deal was helpful to the DoD in 2013 but did come at thecost of lower caps later. Congressional efforts to "help" thePentagon manage the drawdown have really served to elongate its durationrather than ameliorate how much is ultimately owed in the end.

When sequestration went into effect on 1 March, the federalgovernment was operating under a continuing resolution (CR). Thisessentially froze spending based on the prior year levels.Across-the-board cuts were consequently calculated against the CR'sbaseline spending levels. At the time, some observers expressed concernbecause the 2013 president's budget marked a shift in defensepriorities. Coming in concert with a new strategy that moved away fromthe kind of nation-building campaigns the United States undertook inIraq and Afghanistan, the 2013 budget request tended to emphasize airand naval assets at the expense of ground forces. This meant that notonly would sequestration cut substantially from the newer and lowerbaseline, but the reference point itself would fail to reflect newpriorities emphasized in the recent strategic guidance. As a result,some assets would be overfunded while others were underfunded relativeto the president's budget request.

Despite these fears, the CR was not all bad news for the Pentagon.When Congress enacted a full-year 2013 defense appropriations bill inlate March, it superseded the CR--meaning reductions would be appliedagainst the new appropriations levels instead of funding under the CR.In some cases, the 2013 appropriations bill cut program funding belowwhat would have been required if sequestration had been applied againstthe CR. Thanks to an obscure provision of the original 1985 legislationwhich established sequestration, the difference could serve as a creditagainst the total amount the Pentagon owed to certain priorities undersequestration. (15)

For instance, Army "other procurement" was funded atabout $9.5 billion under the continuing resolution and was due forroughly a $1 billion total sequestration cut. (16) But in the 2013appropriations bill, Army other procurement only received roughly $7billion in funding--a cut of about $2.5 billion compared to the CR. Thismeant not only that Army other procurement was exempt fromsequestration, but that the Pentagon was able to "credit" the$1.5 billion cut below the original target to lower its total sequesterbill. (17) Consequently, on first glance, it appeared this Army accountwas a winner in the relative budget dance when in fact it lost much moresignificantly than if automatic spending cuts had taken place blindly.

Pentagon leaders used this crediting mechanism so extensively thatthey were able to redistribute $3.7 billion to other priorities. (18)Crediting, combined with less harsh reductions after the fiscalcliff" deal, softened the ultimate amount owed by the DoD to debtreduction in 2013 from about $52 billion to $37.2 billion. (19) Of thatamount, about $6 billion came from unobligated funding (moneyappropriated in prior years that had yet to be spent), while accordingto a recent Pentagon report, about $32 billion came from moneyappropriated in 2013. (20) The final $20 billion cut to 2013 spendingrepresented a 38 percent reduction from the original Pentagonsequestration bill.

This principle of limited sequestration relief--but only at thelast minute--was repeated in 2014 with the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA)brokered by House Budget Committee chair Paul Ryan and Senate BudgetCommittee chair Patty Murray. As a result of the BBA, thePentagon's sequestration bill was again lessened by about $18billion in 2014 and roughly $8 billion in 2015 relative to the originalsequester plans (see fig. 2).

While every dollar helps, the amount of relief provided under thecompromise is probably overstated. The Pentagon is still on the hook forabout $38 billion in cuts in 2014 and about $50 billion in 2015 relativeto the baseline established by the 2013 budget plans--and more thandouble these amounts compared to Gates' 2012 FYDP. The good news isPentagon leaders and Congress have shown they will employ tools at theirdisposal to maximize flexibility in living with fewer resources and seekevery available relief valve to slow and lengthen the extent of theaustere defense downturn.

2015: More Cuts, Confusion, and Uncertainty

Three budgetary cycles into "sequestration-lite,"policymakers are just beginning to grasp what sequestration means inpractical terms. Between CRs, appropriations, and sequesters, there wasa jarring lack of clarity over the past year about sequestration'simpact--even once it had arrived. Like the "Phony War" periodof World War II after the United Kingdom and France declared war onGermany but before they fought any major battles, much of 2013 could bethought of as the "Phony Sequester." Sequestration, under muchfanfare, was here--but just what it meant was an open question.

In June 2013, the public finally received more information aboutsequestration in practice from a Pentagon report that detailed cuts toeach nonexempt program, project, and activity. In the longer term,Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's Strategic Choices and ManagementReview (SCMR) provided the most complete vision yet of whatsequestration would mean for the US military in concrete terms. In hisspeech detailing the findings, Secretary Hagel outlined a host of comingand potential consequences, including shrinking the active duty Army toas low as 380,000 soldiers and the Marine Corps to 150,000 on one hand,and a "decade-long modernization holiday" on the other. (21)

But these consequences, as alarming as they were, were still yearsaway from becoming reality. Because the 2013 and 2014 presidentialbudget requests largely ignored sequestration in the overly optimistichope that a political deal could be worked out no matter how elusive,Congress still did not have a roadmap of how short-term impacts like theline-by-line rescissions in 2013 would translate into the big pictureconsequences outlined in the SCMR.

Without a medium-term plan to bridge the immediate and the distant,it was very difficult for the public to understand how all the pieces ofthe sequestration puzzle fit together. As it turned out, because the BBAprovided near-term budgetary stability--even as it left the majority ofcuts in place--the Pentagon was able to come up with just such a plan inits 2015 budget cycle.

As soon as Secretary Hagel previewed President Obama's latestbudget in advance of its release, it was clear the request would be themost consequential of this administration. After three years of warningsand worry about sequestration, the 2015 budget presented a roadmap forthe US military's drawdown. Released in tandem with the 2014Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the 2015 budget request painted apicture of what short-term defense budgets, medium-term defenseplanning, long-term defense strategy, and the world as a whole mightlook like under prolonged sequestration. The austere defense picture wasnot pretty. And it should be wholly unacceptable to politicians of allstripes.

Unfortunately, while the 2015 request provided comparatively moreinformation about near-sequestration-level budgets than anything else upto that point, it was still far from clear. In fact, it was constructedand presented in one of the most confusing formats in recent memory.(22) The immediate picture shows the administration abiding by theRyan-Murray agreement with the Pentagon topline complying with the newlyadjusted spending cap. During the rest of the FYDP, the administrationadded about $115 billion over the sequestration caps from 2016 through2019, meaning that budget cuts, while severe, were still not quite asbad as they would be under full sequestration.

Without that $115 billion over the FYDP, the administration wouldhave to resort to even steeper cuts, including reducing one squadron ofF-35 aircraft, eliminating the entire fleet of KC-10 tankers, cuttingseven operational surface combatants, cutting the planned procurement ofeight ships, divesting the entire Global Hawk Block 40 fleet, divestingthe Predator remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) fleet, eliminating plannedpurchases of Reaper aircraft in 2018 and 2019, and cutting servicereadiness even further over the FYDP. (23)

As confusing as it was, the $115 billion was not the onlyadditional funding the administration requested above the sequestrationcaps. As an optional add-on to its request in 2015 only, theadministration proposed a $26 billion opportunity, growth, and securityinitiative (OGSI) that supported priorities such as the purchase of 26AH-64 Apache helicopters and 28 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, eightadditional P-8A Poseidon aircraft, 10 additional C-130J series aircraft,two additional F-35s for the Air Force, as well as roughly $10.6 billionin additional funding for operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts,largely for service readiness. (24) Separate from, but occasionallyoverlapping with, the OGSI was a resurrected $36 billion serviceunfunded priority list, which again included the two additional F-35As,the 10 additional C-130J series aircraft, the eight P-8s, as well as newrequests for six F-35As, one F-35B, five F-35Cs, 10 additional C-130Jsfor the Air National Guard, and 22 EA-18G Growlers.

Despite these proposed spending increases--a clear signal from theadministration that sequestration levels of spending do not adequatelysupport the national defense--the Pentagon scaled back its plan from2014 by about $183 billion and the plan from 2013 by a little over $300billion. These reductions have translated into real pain for themilitary services. Implications include the proposed retirement of theentire A-10 fleet, retiring the U-2 fleet, shrinking the littoral combatship program from 52 ships to 32, and a major realignment of Armyaviation that would transfer all Apache attack helicopters in theNational Guard to the active duty while moving some Blackhawks fromactive duty to the Guard. (25)

Many of these looming cuts will be especially painful because theycome on top of years when the military has not made out as well as itshould have. The Air Force has been especially hard hit by this trend.For instance, since defense budgets peaked in 2010, and including the2015 request, the Navy is on a path to have bought nearly 40 percentmore total aircraft than the Air Force. In fact, after factoring outRPVs, the Navy will have bought more than two and a half times as manyaircraft as the Air Force. When it comes to combat aircraft, the Navywill have bought 264 to the Air Force's 117. Moreover, excludingRPVs, the Air Force has proposed retiring more aircraft than it willhave built during this period.

According to Defense News, the decision to add the $115 billionduring the FYDP came from the White House very late in the Pentagonbudget and planning cycle. (26) It came so late that Pentagon leaderswere not able to budget for everything within their five-year plan thatthey were advertising was in the budget. For instance, when he previewedthe request, Secretary Hagel made clear that the 2015 spending planwould allow for the Navy to maintain 11 aircraft carriers and keep Armyactive duty end strength between 440,000 and 450,000. (27) Yet once thebudget came out, it gradually became clear these high-profile benchmarkswere not funded, even by the extra $115 billion. Instead, the FYDPprojected the loss of one aircraft carrier and a smaller Army of 420,000active duty Soldiers--both of which had been billed publically asconsequences of sequestration that the budget proposal and its extra$115 billion would avoid.

Defense officials have tried to massage this inconsistency bystating recently that if Congress acts to fund the military at thehigher level preferred by the president during the next five years, theywill adjust plans to include the 11th carrier and the higher Army endstrength. But this invariably means other items currently funded wouldbe removed as an offset. What these would include is only a parlorguessing game at this point.

The matter of what is in and out of the budget is crucial becauseit confuses lawmakers trying to understand the impact of smallerbudgets. When there is confusion and misleading answers, Congress willdefault to the assumption that budgets are tight but workable and thepain must not be that bad, at least at the moment. The 2015 budgetprovides the best glimpse into what sequestration and near-sequestrationbudgets would look like. But to the extent there is uncertainty aboutwhat increased funding would buy, it is that much more difficult forskeptical lawmakers to support any defense growth. This locks insequestration-lite-level budgets as the new norm for Pentagon baselinespending, making it even more difficult to add money in the future for avariety of reasons spelled out earlier, including the politics of thefederal budget and inverted firewalls.

Pentagon leaders are to be commended for connecting budgets tomedium- and longer-term implications. This sequestration roadmap, afterall, is what makes the 2015 request and its accompanying literature sovaluable. Yet the Pentagon has thus far been much less effective inarticulating where additional new money would be spent. This confusionover spending plans and additional factors, like the OGSI and theunfunded requirements lists, only serve to create a sense that thePentagon is unable to prioritize where extra money should go. (28) Andin the halls of Congress, if you cannot defend with ready, smart, anddigestible answers about where the funds would go should they beprovided, you are very unlikely to get them.

Moreover, there is an elephant in the middle of the Pentagon's2015 FYDP which is likely to further complicate the entire debate. Bakedinto the plan are five-year efficiencies targets of roughly $94 billion.(29) Among these baked-in savings are a 20 percent cut in headquartersoperating budgets, increased acquisition efficiency, auditable financialstatements, civilian manpower reductions, and most problematic, assumingredirected money from terminating and deferring weapons systems, healthcare changes, and dollars resulting from a new base closure round.According to a Pentagon report, the FYDP includes $31.2 billion incompensation reform alone from initiatives like slowed pay raises and anambitious TRICARE consolidation effort. (30)

Given recent congressional unwillingness to retire older weaponssystems, conduct a base closure round, or substantially adjust militarycompensation, these savings are unlikely to materialize anywhere nearthe degree assumed. (31) As a result, even if Congress gives thePentagon the $115 billion it is requesting above sequestrationcaps--itself a dubious proposition--the Defense Department will be facedwith still more budgetary pressure because its plan assumes savings thatwill not materialize en masse. In the absence of this money freeing upfor other priorities, officials will be forced to make corresponding andadditional reductions elsewhere in the plans. The most likely casualtywill be combat power and research and development.

A good example of this is the proposal to retire the A-10 Warthogfleet. Air Force leaders decided retiring the entire fleet was the onlyway to reap substantial savings totaling more than $4 billion. The Househas rejected the A-10 retirement in its version of the 2015 NationalDefense Authorization Act, and it seems likely the final bill willoverturn all or part of this decision--leading to a significant negativeimpact on other aircraft fleets. Air Force chief of staff Gen Mark Welshhas said that to find equivalent savings if he is prohibited fromcutting the A-10, he would have to cut 363 F-16 Falcons or the entireB-1 fleet out of the service's inventory. (32) None of this is tosay the A-10 is not an incredibly valued asset. But rather this casestudy highlights the paradox of politicians: they consistently raid themilitary's budget as a piggy bank for savings by cutting thetopline but then try to stop any actual consequences resulting fromthose cuts--the same cuts they approved and directed. (33) This"cut without cutting" exercise year after year is a shell gamethat is robbing those in uniform of readiness, modern equipment, andinnovation for the future.

The big-picture result will be that the tightrope the DoD iswalking will eventually snap in half. When he first briefed hismanagement review, Secretary Hagel framed the future of the militaryunder continued sequestration as a choice between a large but olderforce (capacity) or a smaller but modern force (capability). (34) In the2014 QDR and accompanying 2015 budget, the Pentagon has all but declaredit is choosing capability over the depth of the force. Yet, because thisvision of a smaller-but-modern force relies on the "butmodern" qualifier, the DoD will be sorely disappointed. As budgetplans come undone due to congressional opposition to proposed reformsand money requested above the budget caps does not materialize, militaryleaders will be forced to further cannibalize from existing investments.The DoD will end up not with a small but modern force, but a smaller,older, and less-ready military.

This is a result that was predicted by a recent joint exerciseundertaken by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Center forStrategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), the Center for a NewAmerican Security (CNAS), and the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies (CSIS). (35) Using a strategic choices methodology developed bythe CSBA, the teams were tasked with rebalancing Pentagon spending tomeet sequestration and partial sequestration scenarios. Despitedifferent political backgrounds and defense philosophies, the teams madebroadly similar choices in the face of the budget caps, including steepreductions to Army end strength, cutting two or more carriers, divestinglarge amounts of nonstealthy fighters, and shrinking the Navy'ssurface combatant fleet.

Don't Bet on Things Getting Better

As the Pentagon has reacted to ongoing near-sequestration-levelbudgets, it has slowly but surely adjusted its requests downward. Thedefense budget projections are now resigned to nearly fullsequestration. On top of the $487 billion in spending reductionscontained in the 2013 budget request relative to the 2012 plan, the 2014budget cut roughly an additional $120 billion from the Pentagon's2013 plan. The 2015 request followed this by adding an additional $183billion in cuts compared to the lowered 2014 baseline, as shown infigure 3.

This growing acceptance of lower budgets is not unique to theadministration. The House Republican budget proposed by Chairman Ryan inrecent years has also featured a shrinking DoD topline (see fig. 4). In2012, Mr. Ryan's Pentagon topline roughly followed that of formersecretary Gates. In 2013, it added about $223 billion over thePentagon's 2013 plan for pre-sequestration spending. In 2014, theRyan budget largely mirrored the pre-sequestration BCA caps, and Mr.Ryan's 2015 budget cuts about $150 billion from thepre-sequestration caps. While the GOP budget has been slower to fallthan the Pentagon's, the downward trend is unmistakable.

Baselines matter. Unfortunately, sequestration has become thebaseline against which to measure defense requirements. In practice,what this means is that future budgets seeking to restore defensespending will be viewed as politically difficult increases. Already,this has played out when the Obama administration met with criticism forraising planned defense spending above caps in its 2015 budget.

But the sequestration baseline, arbitrary as it is, is no way tobudget for national security. As former secretary of defense LeonPanetta put it, "We have made no plans for a sequester becauseit's a nutty formula, and it's goofy to begin with, andit's not something, frankly, that anybody responsible ought to putinto effect." (36) Military requirements must be informed bystrategy and not the other way around. In his assessment of the QDR2014, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Martin Dempsey arguedthat "If our elected leaders reverse the Budget Control Act capssoon--and if we can execute the promises of the QDR--then I believe wecan deliver security to the nation at moderate risk." (37) OtherPentagon officials have described the risk level inherent in the QDR as"manageable," which implies an even higher threshold than"moderate." Missing is an explanation for why Americans shouldfeel comfortable leaving their military with so little room for error.

After all, in his assessment, the CJCS highlights three areas ofhigher operational risk confronting the military, including (1) moredifficult conventional fights with a smaller and a less ready force, (2)reliance on allies and partners whose military power is "mostly indecline," and (3) "extraordinary" and increasinglydifficult military objectives associated with meeting long-standing USpolicy commitments. These factors strain any reasonable definition ofwhat constitutes a "moderate" risk.

Of course, fitting the square peg of budget cuts because of apolitical deal about debt reduction or reducing funding because"this is what America always does after the war" into theround hole of strategy is no easy task for the Pentagon. It is not theDoD's fault that the president and Congress handed it irresponsiblebudget caps and expect the military to make do. Yet defense officialsshould be making the case daily to the American public of theimplications of a smaller and less capable military. The only way thingswill get better is through public pressure on elected officials.Unfortunately, policymakers feel absolutely no urgency in this regardtoday. But it should not come to a modern-day version of Task ForceSmith to get their attention.

Will World Events Force Washington's Hand?

From air traffic controllers to meat inspectors, veterans'benefits, military paychecks, and tuition assistance, the groups thathave been spared the ax of sequestration have impacted the public andits sympathies in a real way. The irony is that exempting military payhas not spared those in uniform or their families from feeling theimpact of the budget squeeze all around them. US fighting forces are notfooled by these gestures. Quality of life is important but so too isquality of service. Yet, this defense drawdown and sequestration havemeant that maintenance has been dramatically reduced, flying hours havefallen, base upkeep has taken a backseat, and training has been scaledback. And this is just the beginning given that the defense budget willbecome more austere before bottoming out.

Since defense cuts have been slow-rolled through last-minute dealsand budgetary loopholes, the sequester no longer functions as theforcing mechanism it was designed to be. Instead, it is undermining thenational defense slowly and in pieces, bit by bit, while the baselinecreeps ever downward. This slow bleed has caused a growing if begrudgingacceptance of sequestration's baseline as the acceptable levels ofdefense spending by Washington's elite.

In the absence of sharp budgetary pain, this process is likely tocontinue. The harmful result is that the military will muddle alongthrough sequestration, taking the annual last-minute deals that halt theworst consequences of sequestration with relief but knowing that theseleave the majority of it intact. The deals designed to help the militarywill actually seal its fate by relieving just enough pressure toforestall the kind of discomfort that would have caused a public outcryor political pain enough to reverse the sequester.

As this process continues, Chairman Dempsey has already forecastwhat might happen next. All should be worried. Writing again in his riskassessment of the QDR, General Dempsey warned that the military's"loss of depth" could "reduce our ability to intimidateopponents from escalating conflict." Furthermore, the smaller andless capable military outlined in the QDR 2014 could also cause othernations and non-state actors to "act differently, often in harmfulways." (38) It is quite possible that the world Dempsey fears isalready becoming manifest, with increased Russian and Chinese aggressiontaking advantage of the US military's declining size and strength.Given recent Chinese and Russian actions, it is not hard to imagineglobal crises escalating as the US military's reduced capacity andcapability accordingly lessens the nation's ability to influenceworld events. If the US military's shrinking footprint leads tofurther instability and conflict, Congress may soon find that largerdefense budgets are the logical first step toward trying to reign ininternational chaos.

Of course, Congress need not wait until a crisis has passed thepoint of no return to choose to reinvest in US military superiority. Amore logical, responsible, and acceptable path is to reverse course now,before it is too late. A good point of departure would be to returnPentagon spending to the path set by Secretary Gates in FY 2012--about$100 billion dollars per year above where we currently stand for 2015.Preserving the depth of the US military, reinvesting in modernizationfor next-generation programs, and restoring lost readiness will not bean easy task, nor will it be accomplished overnight. Given thealternatives, however, there is not much of a decision to make. Militarypower is a cost-effective use of national power that complements andenhances diplomatic and economic efforts. It is the sine qua non offoreign policy. The choice for the United States in the coming years isnot between endless war on one hand and smart diplomatic power on theother but, rather, a retreat from global leadership and all that entailsand the reconstruction of its military power as a way to leverage andenhance other aspects of national power to promote a just, prosperous,and peaceful world.

Mackenzie Eaglen is a resident fellow at the Marilyn Ware Centerfor Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington,DC. She has worked on defense issues in both the House and Senate and atthe Pentagon.

Notes

(1.) House Armed Services Committee, "Shooting Ourselves inthe Head: What They're Saying on Sequestration," 1,http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=6B2EB53E-4B68-4948-A23D-8881953354E3.

(2.) For practical purposes, this analysis uses"sequestration" interchangeably with "the sequester"to signify the imposition of defense budget cuts at or near the amountof the Budget Control Act's first tranche of $487 billion plus itssequestration mechanism--a total of a little under $1 trillion ($937billion to be exact) as currently modified.

(3.) Mackenzie Eaglen, "Other Services Should FollowNavy's Lead on Warning of Hollow Force," US News & WorldReport, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/01/23/declining-military-resources-have-already-caused-major-disruption.

(4.) Mackenzie Eaglen, "Punting on the Pentagon Budget,"US News & World Report,http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/12/13/the-murray-ryan-budget-deal-is-not-all-good-news-for-the-pentagon.

(5.) Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, "Statement onDepartment Budget and Efficiencies," 6 January 2011,http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1527.

(6.) Bob Woodward, "Obama's Sequester Deal-Changer,"Washington Post, 22 February2013,http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bob-woodward-obamas-sequester-deal-changer/2013/02/22 /c0b65b5e-7ce1-11e2-9a75-dab0201670da_story.html.

(7.) Marc Labonte and Mindy R. Levit, The Budget Control Act of2011: Effects on Spending Levels and the Budget Deficit (Washington:Congressional Research Service, 29 November 2011),https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42013.pdf.

(8.) Ibid., 11.

(9.) Senate Budget Committee, "Informed Budgeteer: The BudgetControl Act," Budget Bulletin,http://www.budget.senate.gov/republican/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=9103016e-b5e4-4048-8b96-dbe84f5b2404.

(10.) Todd Harrison, "What the Fiscal Cliff Deal Means forDefense," CSBA Online, 9 January 2013,http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/01/what-the-fiscal-cliff-deal-means-for-defense/.

(11.) Approaches for Scaling Back the Defense Departments BudgetPlans (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, March 2013), 8,http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43997_Defense_Budget.pdf.

(12.) Senate Budget Committee, "Informed Budgeteer: The BudgetControl Act," 1.

(13.) DoD, "Estimated Impacts of Sequestration-LevelFunding," April 2014, 1-1, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/Sequestration_Impacts.pdf.

(14.) Senate Budget Committee, "Informed Budgeteer:Sequestration after the Fiscal Cliff" Budget Bulletin, 24 January2013, 1, http://www.budget.senate.gov/republican/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=5d725531-1b8e-4881-a30f-cc8c237ed82b.

(15.) Senate Budget Committee, "Informed Budgeteer:Sequestration and Appropriations," 11 June 2013, 1,http://www.budget.senate.gov/republican/public/index.cfm/files/serveiFile_id =f456987b-6fdf-4629-8fb3-dc8805150347.

(16.) Office of Management and Budget, "OMB Report to theCongress on the Joint Committee Sequestration for Fiscal Year2013," Executive Office of the President, 1 March 2013, 16,http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/fy13ombjcseques trationreport.pdf.

(17.) DoD, "Department of Defense Report on the JointCommittee Sequestration for Fiscal Year 2013," June 2013, 4A,http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/Sequestration/Unclassified_Published_Sequestration_Final.pdf.

(18.) Senate Budget Committee, "Informed Budgeteer:Sequestration and Appropriations," 1.

(19.) Senator Pete Domenici et al., "From Merely Stupid toDangerous: The Sequester's Effects on National and EconomicSecurity," Bipartisan Policy Center, October 2013, 13,http://biparti sanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/full%20deck%2010%2010%2013.pdf.

(20.) DoD, "Estimated Impacts of Sequestration-LevelFunding," 1-1.

(21.) Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, "Statement onStrategic Choices and Management Review," 31 July 2013,http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1798.

(22.) Mackenzie Eaglen, "US Dominance, Major Programs at Riskin 2015 Budget," Breaking Defense, 21 January 2014,http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/us-dominance-major-programs-at-risk-in-2015-budget/.

(23.) DoD, "Estimated Impacts of Sequestration-LevelFunding," 1-2.

(24.) DoD, "Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request Overview,"March 2014, 1-5, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_Budget_Request_Overview_Book .pdf. See also DoD, "Opportunity, Growth, andSecurity Initiative Fiscal Year 2015," March 2014, 3,http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_ogsi.pdf.

(25.) Marcus Weisgerber, "DoD Sends Congress $36B Wish List,but Passage Unlikely," Defense News, 3 April 2014,http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140403/DEFREG02/304030025/DoD-Sends-Congress-36B-Wish-List-Passage-Unlikely.

(26.) "Remarks by Secretary Hagel and Gen. Dempsey on theFiscal Year 2015 Budget Preview in the Pentagon Briefing Room," 24February 2014, http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5377.

(27.) Weisgerber, "DoD Sends Congress $36B Wish List, butPassage Unlikely."

(28.) Remarks by Secretary Hagel and Gen Dempsey on the Fiscal Year2015 Budget Preview in the Pentagon Briefing Room.

(29.) DoD, "Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request," March 2014,5, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_Budget_Request.pdf.

(30.) DoD, "Estimated Impacts of Sequestration-LevelFunding," 6-2.

(31.) Mackenzie Eaglen, "Shooting the Pentagon in theFoot," US News & World Report, 28 January 2014,http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/01/28/congress-gets-in-the-way-of-smart-pentagon-cuts.

(32.) "U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark Welsh WillDiscuss the Future of the Air Force," National Press Club, 24 April2014, 7, http://press.org/sites/default/files/20140423 _welsh.pdf.

(33.) Mackenzie Eaglen, "Washington's ParadoxicalPosition on Defense Cuts," AEIdeas, 25 February 2014,http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/washingtons -paradoxical-position-on-defense-cuts/.

(34.) Mackenzie Eaglen, "Hagel's Strategic Review FallsShort; Make Hard Choices Now," Breaking Defense, 26 August 2013,http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/hagels-strategic-review-falls-short-make-hard-choices-now/.

(35.) "Joint Think Tank Event: Alternatives to the QDR andFY15 Defense Budget," Center for Strategic and BudgetaryAssessments, 28 January 2014, http://www.csbaonline.org/2014/01/28/joint-think-tank-event-alternatives-to-the-qdr-and-fy15-defense-budget/.

(36.) House Armed Services Committee, "Shooting Ourselves inthe Head," 1.

(37.) DoD, "Quadrennial Defense Review 2014," 64,http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_ Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

(38.) Ibid.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in SSQ are those of theauthors and are not officially sanctioned by any agency or department ofthe US government. We encourage you to send comments to:[emailprotected].